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Abstract. In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences
of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by sequences of discount factors varying in time.
We determine subgame perfect equilibria for three cases when the strike decision of the union is
exogenous: the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is
a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go on strike only when its own offer is
rejected, and the case when the union is supposed to go never on strike.
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1 Introduction
Collective wage bargaining between firms and unions (workers’ representatives, workers’
groups, etc.) is one of the most central issues in labor economics. Both cooperative and
non-cooperative approaches to collective wage bargaining are applied in the literature;
for surveys of bargaining models see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990); Muthoo (1999).
By using a static (axiomatic) approach initiated by Nash (1950), some labor economists
determine the levels of wage and employment between unions and firms; see e.g. McDonald
and Solow (1981), Nickell and Andrews (1983). Following Binmore (1987); Binmore et al.
(1986), also equilibria that are obtained can be used to measure the bargaining power of
both parties (union and firm). Svejnar (1986) estimates bargaining powers derived from
a Nash bargaining model as functions of exogenous variables. Doiron (1992) extends
Svejnar’s work and uses a generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) model to generate a wage
and employment contract. The weights of the respective utilities in the GNB problem
are the bargaining powers of the parties. The approach based on cooperative games is
presented e.g. in Levy and Shapley (1997), where a wage negotiation is modeled as an
oceanic game and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is used for the solution concept.
Some authors apply a dynamic (strategic) approach to wage bargaining and focus on
the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (that will be denoted here by SPE). Several
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modified versions of Rubinstein’s game (Rubinstein (1982); Fishburn and Rubinstein
(1982)) to firm-union negotiations are proposed. Cripps (1997) who analyzes the model
of investment, considers e.g. the alternating-offer bargaining game over binding long-term
wage contracts and describes a stationary SPE of the game. Also Conlin and Furusawa
(2000) consider a three-stage firm-union bargaining game and investigate SPE of the
game.
Haller and Holden (1990) extend Rubinstein’s model to incorporate the choice of
calling a strike in union-firm negotiations. It is assumed that in each period until an
agreement is reached, the union must decide whether or not it will strike in that period.
It is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique SPE, and that strikes with
a length in real time can occur in SPE. Both parties have the same discount factor
δ. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) consider essentially the same wage-contract sequential
bargaining, but with the union and firm using different discount factors δu, δf . We will be
referring to their model as the F-G model. The authors also show that there exist SPE in
which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement.
Holden (1994) assumes a weaker type of commitment in the F-G model. He proves that
if the union is committed to strike for two periods unless there is an agreement before
that, then there is a unique SPE, although not always the same as the one of Rubinstein’s
model. In the F-G model, the union achieves the maximum-wage contract by threatening
an alternating strike strategy (strike when the firm rejects an offer but continue working at
the old contract wage when the firm makes an unacceptable offer). Bolt (1995) shows that
this SPE only holds if δu ≤ δf . For δu > δf , SPE is restored by modifying the alternating
strike strategies. Houba and Wen (2008) apply the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984)
to derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs in the F-G model and characterize
the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium payoffs for all
discount factors. The authors emphasize that when applying the Shaked and Sutton’s
backward induction argument one must verify the presumption that continuation payoffs
are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier.
There are other numerous works that study strikes in bargaining between unions and
firms, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In Hayes (1984) it is shown
that although a strike seems to be a Pareto-inefficient outcome of bargaining, it can be
the outcome of rational behavior of both agents. In a situation with asymmetric infor-
mation, for instance, strikes can be used to gain more information. Sopher (1990) reports
on an experiment on the frequency of disagreement (strikes) in a set of “shrinking pie”
games in which parties bargain in consecutive periods over how to divide a quantity of
money. Although bargaining theory predicts that no disagreement is involved in the out-
come of a two-person pie-splitting game with complete information, in the experiment
strikes occurred frequently in the games and they did not disappear over time. This can
be supported by the joint-cost theory of strikes which attributes strikes to the costs of ne-
gotiation. Robinson (1999) uses the theory of repeated games to present a dynamic model
of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism of a labor contract. In
particular, he shows that under imperfect observations strikes occur in equilibrium.
Although numerous versions of wage bargaining between unions and firms are pre-
sented in the literature, a common assumption is the stationarity of parties’ preferences
that are described by constant discount factors. In real bargaining, however, due to time
preferences, discount factors of the parties may vary in time. Cramton and Tracy (1994)
2
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emphasize that stationary bargaining models are very rare in real-life situations. They
study wage bargaining with time-varying threats in which the union is uncertain about
the firm’s willingness to pay. Rusinowska (2000, 2001, 2002, 2004) generalizes the original
model of Rubinstein to a bargaining model with non-stationary preferences.
The aim of this paper is to generalize the F-G model to the wage union-firm bargaining
in which both parties have preferences expressed by sequences of discount factors varying
in time. In the whole paper it is assumed that strategies of the parties are independent
of the previous history of the game. We determine SPE for three cases when the strike
decision of the union is exogenous: the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in
each period in which there is a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go
on strike only when its own offer is rejected, and the case when the union is supposed to
go never on strike. First, we show that in the exogenous ‘always-strike’ case, we cannot
apply the generalization of Rubinstein’s bargaining model investigated in Rusinowska
(2000, 2001) to determine SPE. Next, we present the unique SPE for the considered case.
We also determine the unique SPE for each of the two other cases. In order to find these
SPE, we need to solve infinite series of certain linear equations, what we do with a help
of infinite matrices theory.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly recall some basic
information on infinite matrices that is used for proving our results. In Section 3 we
present the generalized model and determine the conditions on the sequences of discount
rates under which the generalization is well defined. Section 4 concerns the exogenous
strike decision, when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there
is a disagreement. In Section 5 we analyze the exogenous strike decision, when the union
goes on strike only after rejection of its own proposals. In Section 6 we determine SPE for
the exogenous no-strike decision case when the union is supposed to go never on strike.
We conclude in Section 7 with mentioning some possible applications of the model and
our future research agenda.
2 Preliminaries on regular triangular systems and infinite
matrices
In this short section, we recall the basic definitions and facts on regular triangular systems
and infinite matrices that will be used later on in the paper. For a detailed information
on infinite systems and matrices, see, e.g., Combes (1957); Davis (1950); Cooke (1950).
Let us consider the following infinite system of equations:
∞∑
j=1
aijxj = yi (i = 1, 2, ..., n, ...) (1)
where aij, xi, yi ∈ R and xi are the unknown here. We can re-write this system in the
matrix form
AX = Y (2)
where A is the matrix of coefficients aij, and X, Y are the column vectors, i.e.,
A = [aij ]i,j∈N+ , X = [(xi)i∈N+ ]
T , Y = [(yi)i∈N+ ]
T
3
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with N+ denoting positive integers and the upper index T denoting the transposition.
The triangular system of equations is the system (1) with aij = 0 for all j < i.
Additionally, if aii 6= 0 then the system is called regular triangular. Without loss of
generality we can assume that aii = 1. The corresponding matrices will be also called
triangular or regular triangular.
One of the fundamental properties is the following:
A regular triangular matrix A possesses a unique inverse matrix,
that is, a matrix B such that BA = I, where I is the infinite identity matrix
(i.e., I = [ijk]j,k∈N+ , ijj = 1 for each j ∈ N
+ and ijk = 0 for every j 6= k).
In order to find the solution X of the system (2), we simply use X = BY . Let
B = [bij]i,j∈N+ . If we suppose that aii = 1 for each i ∈ N
+, then the elements of the first
row of B are determined by
b1,1 = 1, b1,1a1,2 + b1,2 = 0, ..., b1,1a1,j + b1,2a2,j + ...+ b1,j = 0, ... (3)
and the elements of the ith row (for i > 1) are determined by
bi,1 = bi,2 = ... = bi,i−1 = 0, bi,i = 1, bi,iai,i+1 + bi,i+1 = 0, ... (4)
3 Wage bargaining with discount factors varying in time
The bargaining procedure between the union and the firm, as presented in Fernandez
and Glazer (1991), and Haller and Holden (1990) is the following. There is an existing
wage contract, that specifies the wage that a worker is entitled to per day of work, which
has come up for renegotiation. Two parties (union and firm) bargain sequentially over
discrete time and a potentially infinite horizon. They alternate in making offers of wage
contracts that the other party is free to accept or reject. Upon either party’s rejection of
a proposed wage contract, the union must decide whether or not to strike in that period.
The share of the union under the previous contract is w0, where w0 ∈ (0, 1]. By the
new contract, the union and firm will divide the added value (normalized to 1) with new
shares of the parties, where the union’s share is W ∈ [0, 1] and the firm’s share is 1−W .
Figure 1 presents the first three periods of this wage bargaining.
ABOUT HERE FIGURE 1
The union proposes x0 (share for itself). If the firm accepts the new wage contract, the
agreement is reached and the payoffs are (x0, 1−x0). If the firm rejects it, then the union
can either go on strike, and then both parties get (0, 0) in the current period, or go on
with the previous contract with payoffs (w0, 1−w0). If the union goes on strike, it is the
firm’s turn to make a new offer y1, which assigns y1 to the union and (1− y1) to the firm.
This procedure goes on until an agreement is reached, where x2t denotes the offer of the
union made in an even-numbered period 2t, and y2t+1 denotes the offer of the firm made
in an odd-numbered period (2t+ 1).
The key difference between the F-G model and our wage bargaining lies in preferences
of the union and the firm and, as a consequence, in the payoff functions of both parties.
4
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While Fernandez and Glazer (1991) assume stationary preferences described by constant
discount rates δu and δf , we consider a wage bargaining in which preferences of the union
and the firm are described by sequences of discount factors varying in time, (δu,t)t∈N and
(δf,t)t∈N, respectively, where
δu,t = discount factor of the union in period t ∈ N, δu,0 = 1, 0 < δu,0 < 1 for t ≥ 1
δf,t = discount factor of the firm in period t ∈ N, δf,0 = 1, 0 < δf,0 < 1 for t ≥ 1
The result of the wage bargaining is either a pair (W,T ), where W is the wage contract
agreed upon and T ∈ N is the number of proposals rejected in the bargaining, or a
disagreement denoted by (0,∞) and meaning the situation in which the parties never
reach an agreement. We introduce the following notation. Let for each t ∈ N
δu(t) :=
t∏
k=0
δu,k, δf (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δf,k (5)
and for 0 < t′ ≤ t
δu(t
′, t) :=
δu(t)
δu(t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δu,k, δf (t
′, t) :=
δf (t)
δf (t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δf,k (6)
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the union is equal to
U(W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)ut (7)
where ut = W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
ut = 0 if there is a strike in period t ∈ N
ut = w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the firm is equal to
V (W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δf (t)vt (8)
where vt = 1−W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
vt = 0 if there is a strike in period t
vt = 1− w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the disagreement is equal to
U(0,∞) = V (0,∞) = 0 (9)
Since the utilities for both parties depend on the infinite series, the first question is
under which sequences of discount rates these utilities are well defined, i.e., under which
sequences the infinite series are convergent.
5
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Remark 1 The necessary conditions for the convergence of the infinite series which de-
fine U (W,T ) and V (W,T ) in (7) and (8) are the following:
δu(t)→t→+∞ 0 and δf (t)→t→+∞ 0 (10)
However, these are not sufficient conditions.
Proof: The necessary conditions come immediately from the necessary condition of the
convergence of the infinite series. In order to show that it is not a sufficient condition, let
us consider δu,0 = 1, δu,k =
k
k+1
for each k ≥ 1. Then
δu(t) =
1
2
·
2
3
· · ·
t
t+ 1
=
1
t+ 1
→t→+∞ 0
If the agreement W is reached immediately, then
U(W, 0) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)W = W
∞∑
t=0
1
t+ 1
= W
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·
)
which is divergent. Similarly, if W is reached in a certain period T > 0, then we have
U(W,T ) =
T−1∑
t=0
δu(t)ut +
∞∑
t=T
δu(t)W =
T−1∑
t=0
δu(t)ut +W
∞∑
t=T
1
t+ 1

Remark 2 If (δu,t)t∈N as well as (δf,t)t∈N are bounded by a certain number smaller than
1, i.e., if
there exist ∆u < 1 and ∆f < 1 such that δu,t ≤ ∆u and δf,t ≤ ∆f for each t ∈ N (11)
then the series which define U (W,T ) and V (W,T ) in (7) and (8) are convergent.
The sufficient conditions given in (11) are not necessary conditions.
Proof: Assume that there exist ∆u < 1 and ∆f < 1 such that δu,t ≤ ∆u and δf,t ≤ ∆f
for each t ∈ N. Let W be reached in period T . Suppose T = 0. Since δu,t ≤ ∆u for each
t ∈ N, we have
0 < δu(t)W ≤ (∆u)
tW
Since
∑
∞
t=0(∆u)
t is the convergent geometric series, U(W, 0) is also convergent by virtue
of the comparison test. Similarly for T > 0. The proof for the firm is analogous.
Consider the following sequence of discount rates: δu,0 = 1, δu,k =
k
k+2
for each k ≥ 1.
Obviously the sequence does not satisfy the condition (11). However, we have for t ≥ 1
δu(t) =
1
3
·
2
4
·
3
5
· · ·
t
t+ 2
=
2
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
→t→+∞ 0
6
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If the agreement W is reached immediately, then
U(W, 0) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)W = W +W
∞∑
t=1
2
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
which is convergent by virtue of the comparison test: 1
t2
≥ 1
(t+1)(t+2)
and we know that∑
∞
t=1
1
t2
is convergent. The proof is similar, if W is reached in a certain period T > 0. 
Remark 3 Every decreasing sequence (δu,t)t∈N ((δf,t)t∈N, respectively) gives the conver-
gent series defined in (7) (defined in (8), respectively). Some increasing sequences lead to
the convergent series as well.
Proof: It results immediately from the fact that every decreasing sequence satisfies (11).
Take δu,0 = 1, δu,k =
1
2
− 1
2k+2
for each k ≥ 1. The sequence is increasing (δu,k+1 > δu,k
for each k ≥ 1), and δu,k <
1
2
, so it satisfies the sufficient condition for convergence of the
infinite series defined in (7). 
Remark 4 We restrict our analysis to the case in which the discount rates satisfy con-
dition (11). Hence, in particular, for each t ∈ N,
∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) ≤
∆f
1−∆f
,
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) ≤
∆u
1−∆u
(12)
Moreover, we assume that the strategies do not depend on the former history of the
game. In the whole paper we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Let W
2t
denote an offer of the union in period 2t (t ∈ N), and let Z
2t+1
denote an offer of the firm in period (2t + 1). We consider only the family of strategies
(su, sf ), where in each period (2t+1) the union accepts an offer y of the firm if and only
if y ≥ Z
2t+1
, and in each period 2t the firm accepts an offer x of the union if and only if
x ≤ W
2t
. A strategy of the union specifies additionally its strike decision.
4 Going always on strike under a disagreement
We analyze the case when the strike decision of the union is exogenous, and the union is
supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. Fernandez and
Glazer (1991) show that in such a case, if preferences are defined by constant discount
factors, then there is a unique SPE of the wage bargaining game. It coincides with the
SPE in Rubinstein’s model and leads to an agreement W =
1−δf
1−δuδf
reached in period 0.
Obviously, this equilibrium result does not hold if the parties’ preferences are expressed
by discount factors varying in time. We determine SPE in the model with the exogenous
strike decision and discount factors varying in time, i.e., we generalize the equilibrium
result obtained in Fernandez and Glazer (1991). Since for determining a SPE we must
consider any possible subgame of the game, and the utilities of the parties are given by
the infinite series and take into account any period till infinity, we have the following:
7
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Fact 1 Consider the generalized F-G model with preferences of the union and the firm
described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for
t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Assume that the strike decision is given exogenously and the union is
supposed to go on strike in every period in which there is a disagreement. Then (su, sf ) in
Assumption 1 is a SPE of this game if and only if the offers satisfy the following infinite
system of equations: for each t ∈ N
(
1−W
2t
)
+
(
1−W
2t
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) =
(
1− Z
2t+1
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) (13)
and
Z
2t+1
+ Z
2t+1
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) = W
2t+2
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) (14)
In Rusinowska (2000, 2001) it is shown that in the generalized Rubinstein model with
preferences of the players described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where
δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = u, f , such that
∏t+1
j=1 δu,2jδf,2j−1 −→t→+∞ 0, there is
only one SPE, where the offers of the players are as follows1:
W
0
= 1− δf,1 +
+∞∑
n=1
(
n∏
k=1
δu,2kδf,2k−1)(1− δf,2n+1) (15)
W
2t+2
=
W
2t
+ δf,2t+1 − 1
δu,2t+2δf,2t+1
and Z
2t+1
= W
2t+2
δu,2t+2 for each t ∈ N (16)
Unfortunately, we cannot apply this result to the generalized F-G model with the
exogenous strike decision.
Fact 2 The generalized F-G model in which the strike decision is given exogenously and
the union is supposed to go on strike in every period in which there is a disagreement,
does not coincide with the generalized Rubinstein model, and in general the SPE of the
two models are different.
Proof: In order to find the SPE offers in the generalized Rubinstein model, we need to
solve the following infinite system of equations: for each t ∈ N
(1−W
2t
) = (1− Z
2t+1
)δf,2t+1 and Z
2t+1
= W
2t+2
δu,2t+2 (17)
which leads to the solution given in (15) and (16). In order to find the SPE offers in the
generalized F-G model with the exogenous “going always to strike” decision, we need to
solve the infinite system of equations given by (13) and (14), for each t ∈ N.
For the model with constant discount rates δu and δf , theses two infinite systems of
equations are equivalent. For each t ∈ N
∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) =
δf
1− δf
and
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) =
δu
1− δu
1 We keep here the same notation u and f for the players, although Rusinowska (2000, 2001) did not consider
union-firm bargaining, but only a generalization of the original Rubinstein model in which preferences of players
1 and 2 were described by discount rates varying in time.
8
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so inserting these sums into the system of equations (13) and (14) gives us equivalently
the system of equations (17). However, theses two infinite systems of equations are NOT
equivalent if we consider the generalized F-G model, since for any t 6= t′, usually
∞∑
k=t
δf (t, k) 6=
∞∑
k=t′
δf (t
′, k)
∞∑
k=t
δu(t, k) 6=
∞∑
k=t′
δu(t
′, k)
As an illustrative example, consider a very simple model with the following discount rates:
δf,1 = δu,1 =
1
2
, and δf,t = δu,t =
1
3
for each t ≥ 2. Then
∞∑
k=1
δf (1, k) =
3
4
,
∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) =
1
2
for each t ≥ 1
In other words, solving the system (17) gives W
0
= 5
8
, W
2t
= 3
4
for each t ≥ 1, Z
2t+1
= 1
4
for each t ∈ N , but this solution does not satisfy the first equation of the system (13),
i.e., (
1−W
0
)
+
(
1−W
0
) ∞∑
k=1
δf (1, k) 6=
(
1− Z
1
) ∞∑
k=1
δf (1, k)

By solving the infinite system (13) and (14), we get the following:
Theorem 1 Consider the generalized F-G model with preferences of the union and the
firm described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1
for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Assume that the strike decision is given exogenously and the union is
supposed to go on strike in every period in which there is a disagreement. Then there is
the unique SPE of the form (su, sf ) in Assumption 1, in which the offers of the parties
are given by
W
0
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
+
∞∑
m=0
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k)
m∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
(18)
and for each t ∈ N
W
2t+2
=
[
W
2t (
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
)
− 1
] (
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
)
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(19)
Z
2t+1
=
W
2t+2∑∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(20)
9
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Proof: By virtue of Fact 1, we need to solve the infinite system of equations (13) and
(14), which can be equivalently written, for each t ∈ N, as
W
2t
− Z
2t+1
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
(21)
and
Z
2t+1
−W
2t+2
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
= 0 (22)
From (22) we get immediately (20), and inserting Z
2t+1
into (21) gives (19). In order to
find W
0
we can use one of the following two methods:
Method 1
Note that the infinite system of (21) and (22) is a regular triangular system AX = Y ,
with A = [aij ]i,j∈N+ , X = [(xi)i∈N+ ]
T , Y = [(yi)i∈N+ ]
T , where for each t, j ≥ 1
at,t = 1, at,j = 0 for j < t or j > t+ 1 (23)
and for each t ∈ N
a2t+1,2t+2 = −
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
, a2t+2,2t+3 = −
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(24)
x2t+1 = W
2t
, x2t+2 = Z
2t+1
, y2t+1 =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
, y2t+2 = 0 (25)
We know that any regular triangular matrix A possesses the (unique) inverse matrix B,
i.e., there exists B such that BA = I, where I is the infinite identity matrix. The matrix
B = [bij]i,j∈N+ is also regular triangular, and its elements are the following:
bt,t = 1, bt,j = 0 for each t, j ≥ 1 such that j < t (26)
for each t ∈ N
b2t+1,2t+2 =
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
, b2t+2,2t+3 =
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(27)
and for each t,m ∈ N and m > t
b2t+2,2m+2 =
m−1∏
j=t
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+3 δf (2j + 3, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+3 δf (2j + 3, k))
(28)
b2t+2,2m+3 =
m−1∏
j=t
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+3 δf (2j + 3, k)
∑
∞
k=2m+2 δu(2m+ 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+3 δf (2j + 3, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+2 δu(2m+ 2, k))
(29)
10
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b2t+1,2m+1 =
m−1∏
j=t
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
(30)
b2t+1,2m+2 =
m−1∏
j=t
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
∑
∞
k=2m+1 δf (2m+ 1, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+1 δf (2m+ 1, k))
(31)
Next, by applying X = BY we get W
0
as given by (18).
Method 2
By virtue of (21) and (22), we have for each t ∈ N
W
2t
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
+
W
2t+2∑∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k))
and hence, for each t ≥ 1
W
0
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
+
t−1∑
m=0
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k)
m∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
+W
2t+2
t∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
(32)
As it will be shown below, we have 0 ≤ W
2t+2
≤ 1, and by virtue of (12),
t∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
=
t∏
j=0
(
1−
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
)(
1−
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
)
≤
≤ (∆f∆u)
t+1 →t→+∞ 0
Hence, by virtue of the three sequences theorem, we get W
0
as given by (18).
Proving that W
0
, Z
2t+1
,W
2t+2
∈ [0, 1] for each t ∈ N
Obviously W
0
≥ 0. Let us consider the sequence of partial sums
St =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
+
11
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t∑
m=0
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k)
m∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
The sequence is obviously increasing, and also St ≤ 1 for each t ∈ N, because
St =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
+
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=3 δf (3, k))
+· · ·+
+
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k) · · ·
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k)) · · · (1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+3 δf (2t+ 3, k))
and when putting all elements of the sum on the same denominator
t∏
j=0
(1 +
∞∑
k=2j+1
δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∞∑
k=2j+2
δu(2j + 2, k))(1 +
∞∑
k=2t+3
δf (2t+ 3, k))
this denominator is greater than the corresponding nominator. Hence, St ≤ 1 for each
t ∈ N, and therefore W
0
= limt→+∞ St ≤ 1.
From (32) we have for each t ∈ N
W
2t+2
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+3 δf (2t+ 3, k)
+
∞∑
m=t+1
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k)
m∏
j=t+1
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
Obviously W
2t+2
≥ 0, and we get also W
2t+2
≤ 1 by using the same method as the one
for showing that W
0
≤ 1.
Since 0 ≤ W
2t+2
≤ 1, from (20) we have 0 ≤ Z
2t+1
< 1. 
Example 1 When we apply our result to the wage bargaining studied by Fernandez and
Glazer (1991), we get obviously their result. Let us calculate the share W
0
that the union
proposes for itself at the beginning of the game. We have δf,t = δf and δu,t = δu for each
t ∈ N. Hence, for each j ∈ N
1 +
∞∑
k=2j+1
δf (2j + 1, k) = 1 + δf + (δf )
2 + · · · =
1
1− δf
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
= δf ,
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
= δu
and therefore, by inserting this into (18), we get
W
0
= (1− δf ) + (1− δf )
[
δfδu + (δfδu)
2 + · · ·
]
=
1− δf
1− δfδu
and W
2t+2
= W
0
for each t ∈ N.
12
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Example 2 Let us analyze a model in which the union and the firm have the following
sequences of discount factors varying in time: for each t ∈ N
δf,2t+1 = δu,2t+1 =
1
2
, δf,2t+2 = δu,2t+2 =
1
3
For each j ∈ N,
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k) < +∞ and
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k) < +∞, and
∞∑
k=2j+1
δf (2j + 1, k) =
1
2
+
1
2
·
1
3
+
1
2
·
1
3
·
1
2
+ · · · =
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
6
+
1
62
+ · · ·
)
+
1
6
(
1 +
1
6
+
1
62
+ · · ·
)
=
4
5
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k)
=
1∑
∞
k=2j+3 δf (2j + 3, k)
=
5
9
,
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
=
4
9
∞∑
k=2j+2
δu(2j + 2, k) =
1
3
+
1
3
·
1
2
+
1
3
·
1
2
·
1
3
+ · · · =
=
1
3
(
1 +
1
6
+
1
62
+ · · ·
)
+
1
6
(
1 +
1
6
+
1
62
+ · · ·
)
=
3
5∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
=
3
8
Hence, by virtue of (18) the offer of the union in period 0 in the SPE is equal to
W
0
=
5
9
+
4
9
·
3
8
·
5
9
+
(
4
9
·
3
8
)2
·
5
9
+ · · · =
5
9
(
1 +
1
6
+
1
62
+ · · ·
)
=
2
3
Note again that if we would apply the generalization of the original Rubinstein model to
this example, i.e., the formula given by (15), then we would get W
0
= 3
5
.
5 Going on strike only after rejection of own proposals
Haller and Holden (1990) consider also another game with the strike decision taken ex-
ogenously, in which the union goes on strike only after its own proposal is rejected, and
it holds out if a proposal of the firm is rejected. They analyze the model in which the
union and the firm have the same discount factor δ and show that in such a game there
is the unique SPE with the union’s offer equal to W = 1+δw0
1+δ
. We generalize this game to
discount rates varying in time.
Fact 3 Consider the generalized F-G model with preferences of the union and the firm
described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for
t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Assume that the strike decision is given exogenously and the union
is supposed to go on strike only after rejection of its own proposals. Then (su, sf ) in
13
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Assumption 1 is a SPE of this game if and only if the offers satisfy the following infinite
system of equations: for each t ∈ N(
1−W
2t
)
+
(
1−W
2t
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) =
(
1− Z
2t+1
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) (33)
and
Z
2t+1
+ Z
2t+1
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) = w0 +W
2t+2
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) (34)
By solving the infinite system (33) and (34), we get the following result:
Theorem 2 Consider the generalized F-G model with preferences of the union and the
firm described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1
for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Assume that the strike decision is given exogenously and the union is
supposed to go on strike only after rejection of its own proposals. Then there is the unique
SPE of the form (su, sf ) defined in Assumption 1, in which the offers of the parties are
given by
W
0
=
1 + w0
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k) +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k))
+
∞∑
m=0
1 + w0
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k) +
∑
∞
k=2m+4 δu(2m+ 4, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+4 δu(2m+ 4, k))
·
m∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
(35)
and for each t ∈ N
W
2t+2
=
[
W
2t (
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
)
− 1
] (
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
)
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
+
−
w0∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(36)
Z
2t+1
=
w0 +W
2t+2∑∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(37)
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. By virtue of Fact 3, we need
to solve the infinite system of equations (33) and (34), which can be equivalently written,
for each t ∈ N, as
W
2t
− Z
2t+1
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
=
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
(38)
and
Z
2t+1
−W
2t+2
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
=
w0
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(39)
From (39) we get immediately (37), and inserting Z
2t+1
into (38) gives (36). In order to
find W
0
we can use again one of the following two methods:
14
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Method 1
The infinite system of (38) and (39) is also a regular triangular system AX = Y with
A = [aij]i,j∈N+ , X = [(xi)i∈N+ ]
T , Y = [(yi)i∈N+ ]
T , where the matrix A is the same as in
the case of Theorem 1, and is described by (23) for each t, j ≥ 1 and by (24) for each
t ∈ N. Moreover, we have
x2t+1 = W
2t
, x2t+2 = Z
2t+1
y2t+1 =
1
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
, y2t+2 =
w0
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
Hence, the only difference between the present case and the always-strike decision case
lies in y2t+2, but it obviously changes the solution X. Since we have the same regular
triangular matrix A, its (unique) inverse matrix B, i.e., B such that BA = I, is the same.
Hence, we have B = [bij ]i,j∈N+ given by the formula from (26) till (31). By applying
X = BY we get W
0
as given by (35).
Method 2
By virtue of (38) and (39), we have for each t ∈ N
W
2t
=
1 + w0
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k) +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k))
+
+
W
2t+2∑∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δf (2t+ 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δu(2t+ 2, k))
and hence, for each t ≥ 1
W
0
=
1 + w0
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k) +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δf (1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2 δu(2, k))
+
t−1∑
m=0
1 + w0
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k) +
∑
∞
k=2m+4 δu(2m+ 4, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+3 δf (2m+ 3, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2m+4 δu(2m+ 4, k))
·
m∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
+
+W
2t+2
t∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, since 0 ≤ W
2t+2
≤ 1 and
t∏
j=0
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k))(1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k))
→t→+∞ 0
by virtue of the three sequences theorem, we get W
0
as given by (35).
15
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Proving that W
0
, Z
2t+1
,W
2t+2
∈ [0, 1] for each t ∈ N
Since 0 ≤ w0 ≤ 1, from (37) it is obvious that 0 ≤ Z2t+1 ≤ 1. Moreover, W
0
≥ 0.
The proof that W
0
≤ 1 goes analogously as the proof of Theorem 1 by considering the
sequence of partial sums St and showing that St ≤ 1 for each t ∈ N. Similarly one can
show that 0 ≤ W
2t+2
≤ 1.

Example 3 Let us apply this result to the wage bargaining studied by Fernandez and
Glazer (1991), i.e., we have δf,t = δf and δu,t = δu for each t ∈ N. Hence, for each j ∈ N
∞∑
k=2j+1
δf (2j + 1, k) =
δf
1− δf
,
∞∑
k=2j+2
δu(2j + 2, k) =
δu
1− δu
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
= δf ,
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
= δu
and therefore, by inserting this into (35), we get
W
0
= (1− δf )(1− δu)
(
1 +
w0δf
1− δf
+
δu
1− δu
)[
1 + δfδu + (δfδu)
2 + · · ·
]
=
=
1− δf + w0δf (1− δu)
1− δfδu
= w0 +
(1− δf )(1− w0)
1− δfδu
and W
2t+2
= W
0
for each t ∈ N.
If additionally we assume that δf = δu = δ, then W
0
= 1+δw0
1+δ
, which coincides with the
result by Haller and Holden (1990).
Example 4 We analyze a model presented in Example 2 in which the union and the
firm have the following sequences of discount factors varying in time: for each t ∈ N
δf,2t+1 = δu,2t+1 =
1
2
, δf,2t+2 = δu,2t+2 =
1
3
Then we have
∞∑
k=2j+1
δf (2j + 1, k) =
4
5
,
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+1 δf (2j + 1, k)
=
4
9
∞∑
k=2j+2
δu(2j + 2, k) =
3
5
,
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=2j+2 δu(2j + 2, k)
=
3
8
By virtue of (35) the offer of the union in period 0 in the SPE is equal to
W
0
=
(
1 +
4
5
w0 +
3
5
)
·
5
9
·
5
8
·
[
1 +
4
9
·
3
8
+
(
4
9
·
3
8
)2
+ · · ·
]
=
2 + w0
3
16
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6 Going never on strike
In case of the exogenous never-strike decision of the union, the unique SPE leads to the
minimum wage contract w0. We have the following:
Fact 4 Consider the generalized F-G model with preferences of the union and the firm
described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for
t ≥ 1, i = u, f . Assume that the no-strike decision is given exogenously and the union
never goes on strike. Then there is the unique SPE of the form defined in Assumption 1,
where W
2t
= Z
2t+1
= w0 for each t ∈ N.
Proof: Suppose that the union never goes on strike. In order to find the SPE offers W
2t
and Z
2t+1
, we solve for each t ∈ N
(
1−W
2t
)
+
(
1−W
2t
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k) = (1− w0) +
(
1− Z
2t+1
) ∞∑
k=2t+1
δf (2t+ 1, k)
(40)
and
Z
2t+1
+ Z
2t+1
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) = w0 +W
2t+2
∞∑
k=2t+2
δu(2t+ 2, k) (41)
Obviously, W
2t
= Z
2t+1
= w0 for each t ∈ N is a solution of this system of equations, and
we know from the infinite matrices theory that this system has the only one solution. 
7 Concluding remarks
There are several issues in our agenda for future research on the generalized F-G model.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Houba and Wen (2008) apply the method of Shaked
and Sutton (1984) to derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs in the original F-G
model. We intend to apply their method to find the maximum wage in our generalized F-
G model. Since we assume that the sequence of discount rates of a party can be arbitrary,
with the only restriction that the infinite series that determines the utility of a result for
the given party must be convergent, we will first describe the conditions in a general case
for the supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs in any even period and for the infimum
of the firm’s SPE payoffs in any odd period. Then, we will be solving the conditions for
particular cases of the sequences of discount rates varying in time.
Several authors analyze the issues of bargaining power, both in the standard bargain-
ing models and in the wage bargaining, where the parties have constant discount rates.
Since discount rates are usually crucial in determining bargaining power of parties, it
is of importance to study the bargaining power issues also in our framework, i.e., in the
generalized models with preferences of the union and the firm described by discount rates
varying in time.
We would like also to provide a detailed analysis of some applications of the generalized
F-G model to real-life situations. Bargaining with discount rates varying in time, and its
generalized wage bargaining version in which utilities of bargainers are of the type (7) and
17
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(8), can model bargaining faced in reality (much) better than the analogous bargaining
with constant discount rates. Patience of parties may obviously be changing over time, due
to many circumstances, e.g., economic, financial, political, social, environmental, health
or climatic issues. Moreover, in many situations, the utility of an agreement is counted
not only in one step (the given period when the agreement is achieved), but is the long-
term utility. If we negotiate wage for workers or a price of a pharmaceutical product, the
agreement is valid for a longer time. Even if the time of implementing the given agreement
is finite, its expiration time might be not known, and therefore it is appropriate to define
the utilities by the type (7) and (8). Consequently, since the discount rates are varying in
time, it is the generalized F-G framework that is more suitable than the original model.
18
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Period
0 Union: Propose x0
?
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Game ends
(x0, 1− x0)
Union: Strike / No Strike
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 
 
  	
1 Firm: Propose y1
?
Union: Accept/Reject
 
 
  	
@
@
@@R
Y N
Game ends
(y1, 1− y1)
Union: Strike / No Strike
(0, 0) (W0, 1−W0)
 
 
  	
2 Union: Propose x2
etc.
Figure 1: Non-cooperative bargaining game between the union and the firm
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